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State Aid and Air Transport in the Shadow of
COVID-19
Steven TRUXAL*
As demand for air travel has fallen in response to the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19)
crisis, the global air transport sector has been severely impacted. This article investigates the extent
to which and on what conditions state aid measures are applied to airlines, airports, air
navigation service providers and aircraft manufacturers in response to the crisis. In that connection,
reflections are offered in this article on the role of the State and the flexibility of EU state aid law
in these unprecedented times.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) crisis is characterized by taking an
unimaginable toll on human life and causing economic damage of yet-
unknown proportions. The global air transport sector began to be seriously
affected as States closed borders and significantly restricted movements of
visitors, residents and citizens in response to the outbreak and spread of
COVID-19. As a result, demand for air travel has fallen sharply and at an
unprecedented rate.1
At the time of writing, a great majority of global airlines have ceased operating
all but very few repatriation services or have pivoted to cargo-only operations;
others have grounded entire fleets. Airports have closed runways to free up space
for parked aircraft or shut down indefinitely. Air navigation service providers
(ANSPs) continue working to keep the airspace open and safe, albeit with mini-
mum staffing on strict rotations. Manufacturers of aircraft and parts have largely
shut-down their production lines.
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1 Globally, passenger demand fell by 94.3% in Apr. 2020 compared with Apr. 2019; IATA, Air Passenger
Market Analysis (Apr. 2020), https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-
reports/air-passenger-monthly-analysis—apr-20202/ (accessed 5 June 2020).
This article will begin with a general overview of EU state aid law followed by
measures related to COVID-19.2 The article will then investigate legal issues and
particularities in the context of state aid measures as applied to the different air
transport stakeholders in the present crisis. The focus throughout this work is on
the situation in the European Union (EU). The bulk of state aid activity concerns
airlines; thus they will feature greatest. The aim is to identify the extent to which,
if at all, States will assist stakeholders and on what conditions. the conclusion offers
a reflection on the role of the State and flexibility of EU state aid law in a time of
unprecedented crisis.
2 EU STATE AID LAW
2.1 GENERAL
According to Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU):
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be
incompatible with the internal market.3
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) determined that ‘the concept
of “undertaking” covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of
its legal status and the way in which it is financed’.4 States ‘act either by exercising
public powers or by carrying on economic activities of an industrial or commercial
nature by offering goods and services on the market’.5 When the State activity in
2 See for detailed coverage of EU state aid law, Kely Bacon QC, European State Aid Law (3rd ed., OUP
2017); Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger & Piet Slot, EU State Aids (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2016).
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), [2012] OJ C 326/47, 91 (26 Oct. 2012).
While Art. 107(1) TFEU does not define ‘aid’, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has clarified the notion of ‘aid’, e.g. in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium
Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, [2003] ECR I-7747, para. 75. See also European
Commission, ‘Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
TFEU’, [2016] OJ C 262, 1–50 (19 July 2016). See on the evolution of the concept, Juan Jorge Piernas
López, The Concept of State Aid Under EU Law: From Internal Market to Competition and Beyond (OUP
2015).
4 Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, [2006] ECR I-289, para. 107; See also Case
C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21. While these
cases dealt with the concept of ‘undertaking’ in the sphere of EU competition law, the CJEU’s
interpretation of the concept also concerns the prohibition laid down in Art. 107(1) TFEU. See Alison
Jones, The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law, 8(2) Eur. Competition J. 301–331
(2012).
5 Case C-118/85, Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 2599, para. 7; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/
98, Pavlov and Others, [2000] ECR I-6451, para. 75; Case C-49/07, MOTOE, [2008] ECR I-4863,
para. 22.
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question is done in exercise of its public powers, in general it will not fall within
the scope of state aid. However, when a State is engaged in an economic activity,
this may be severable from its activities as a public authority.
A state-owned airline is an undertaking engaged in economic activity.6 A
State’s management and operation of an airport it owns are not connected to the
exercise of its powers of public authority; therefore, the provision of airport
services to airlines and other service providers constitute economic activity.7
Thus, each of the ‘various activities of an entity must be considered individually’
to determine their nature.8 In general, most activities ANSPs provide are con-
sidered to be non-economic in nature.9 Public funding of non-economic activities
generally does not constitute state aid.
Public funding will constitute aid, however, if an undertaking benefits from an
unfair advantage; this is assessed by applying the so-called Market Economy
Operator (MEO) test.10 The MEO test assesses ‘whether, in similar circumstances,
a private investor of a comparable size operating in normal conditions of a market
economy could have been prompted to make the investment in question’.11 Each
instance of funding must be assessed separately to determine what drives the State’s
intervention. Where a State acts for public policy reasons, it does so qua public
authority and not qua economic operator. In such a situation, the MEO test will
not normally be applicable.12 A State’s intervention must be in line with ‘normal
conditions of market economy’, which is examined on an ex ante basis13 through a
‘global assessment of the effects of the transaction on the undertaking concerned’.14
6 EU state aid rules also apply, procedurally and substantively, to public service obligations (PSOs). Air
transport PSOs can only be imposed in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Sept. 2008 on common rules for the operation of air
services in the Community, [2008] OJ L 293/3 (31 Oct. 2008).
7 Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission, [2000] ECR II-3929, paras 108, 125; upheld on
appeal in Case C-82/01 P, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission, [2002] ECR I-9297, paras 65–57, 77, 81;
and Joined Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08, Freistaat Sachsen, Flughafen Leipzig-Halle et al v. Commission,
[2011] ECR II-1311, paras 93–94; upheld on appeal in Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG
and Leipzig-Halle Flughafen GmbH v. Commission, [2012] ECLI 821.
8 Case C-113/07 P, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v. Commission, [2009] ECR I-2207, para. 14.
9 Case C-364/92, SAT/Eurocontrol, [1994] ECR I-43, para. 30; SELEX, supra n. 8, para. 71. However,
the maintenance on an airport of ground traffic control lighting has been interpreted as an economic
activity. See SA.14093, Charleroi Airport, [2014] OJ L 137/1 (1 Oct. 2014), paras 390–400; European
Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Investment for Czech Ostrava Airport, Press Release IP/14/
176 (20 Feb. 2014), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_176, accessed 12
May 2020.
10 See for development by the Union courts of the underlying MEO principle, e.g. Case T-16/6,
Cityflyer Express v. Commission, [1998] ECLI-78, para. 51.
11 European Commission, Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107(1) of the
TFEU, [2016] OJ C 262/17, para. 74.
12 Ibid., paras 76–77.
13 Ibid., para. 78.
14 Ibid., para. 79.
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Finally, and to be distinguished from the above discussion on EU law, the
granting of ‘subsidies’ to the fourth group of stakeholders, aircraft manufacturers, is
governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.15 The long-standing, on-going Boeing-Airbus WTO
subsidy disputes are fitting examples.16
The European Commission (EC) controls state aid. It has the power to
order national courts to enforce state aid law and to require Member States to
recover unlawful and incompatible aid.17 The EC exercised this power many
times before with respect to airlines in Sabena,18 Iberia,19 Aer Lingus,20 TAP
Air Portugal,21 Air France,22 Olympic Airways23 and Alitalia.24 The EC also
ordered state aid granted to airports to be returned, for instance, in
Charleroi.25
European state aid may be justified if the aid is used, for instance, for general
economic development26; to rescue or restructure an undertaking27; to remedy a
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State28; or to compensate
for damages caused by exceptional occurrences.29 The EC enforces the general
prohibition and grants exceptions on a case-by-case or ‘block’ basis, where
necessary.30 The general rule is that a Member State may only distribute aid if it
15 In the Agreement, ‘subsidy’ defined in Art. 1 and prohibitions are set out in Art. 4. See Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 Apr. 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. [Not reproduced in I.L.M.].
16 See DSU Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO
Doc. DS316, (11 Dec. 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm,
accessed 12 May 2020.
17 Article 108(3) TFEU, supra n. 3. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission:
Commission Notice on the Recovery of Unlawful and Incompatible State Aid, [2019] OJ C247, 1–23 (23 July
2019).
18 Sabena, [1991] OJ L 300/48.
19 European Commission, XXII Report on Competition Policy 269 (1993).
20 Commission Decision 94/118/EC of 21 Dec. 1993 Concerning Aid to be Provided by the Irish
Government to the Aer Lingus Group, OJ L 54, 30–41 (25 Feb. 1994).
21 Commission Decision 94/698/EC of 6 July 1994 Concerning Increase in Capital, Credit Guarantees
and an Exemption in Favour of TAP, OJ L 279, 29–42 (28 Oct. 1994).
22 Commission Decision 94/653/EC of 27 July 1994 Concerning the Notified Capital Increase of Air
France, OJ L 254, 73–89 (30 Sept. 1994).
23 Commission Decision 94/696/EC of 7 Oct. 1994 on the Aid Granted by Greece to Olympic Airways,
OJ L 273, 22–37 (25 Oct. 1994).
24 Case C26/2008 (ex. NN31/2008),Prêt de 300 millions d’euros à Alitalia, [2009] OJ L 52/3 (25 Feb.
2009).
25 Charleroi, [2003] OJ C 18/03 (18 Mar. 2003).
26 TFEU, supra n. 3, Art. 107(3)(c).
27 European Commission, Guidelines for State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Non-Financial Undertakings
in Difficulty, [2014] OJ C 249/1 (31 July 2014).
28 TFEU, supra n. 3, Art. 107(3)(b).
29 TFEU, supra n. 3, Art. 107(2)(b).
30 Commission Regulation (EC) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 Declaring Certain Categories of Aid
Compatible with the Internal Market in Application of Arts 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187,
1–78 (26 June 2014).
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first notifies the aid to the EC, and the EC approves it.31 According to the di
minimis rule, small aid amounts are exempted from the notification requirement.32
All financial injections Member States provide to a public or private undertakings
must be made public.33
In EU state aid law, States may define certain economic activities to be carried
out as services of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in some cases, and provide
compensation to the service provider.34 Public funding to discharge a clearly-
defined SGEI will not constitute an advantage for purposes of Article 107(1) of the
TFEU if the four Altmark criteria are fulfilled. On a case-by-case basis, defining a
SGEI obligation and offering compensation may be justified when the recipients of
such compensation ‘do not enjoy a real financial advantage and the measure thus
does not have the effect of putting them in a more favourable competitive position
than the undertakings competing with them’.35 In turn, the public support would
not qualify as state aid within the scope of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.
EU air transport sectoral rules provide that public authorities may impose
public service obligations (PSOs) with respect to certain routes ‘to fulfil transport
needs which cannot be adequately met by an existing air route or by other means
of transport’.36 Compensation paid to airlines operating such PSO routes may not
exceed the amount necessary to cover the net costs to discharge PSO service. If the
operating airline’s profit on the routes is greater than what is reasonable, doubts
may be arise over the compensation and compliance with state aid law. States may
also impose PSOs on airports to ensure they remain open to commercial traffic.37
Subject to state aid and public procurement rules, a State may impose ‘urgent
PSOs’ without public tender.38
31 TFEU, supra n. 3, Art. 108(3). In exceptional circumstances post-notification of state aid is allowed
under EU law. See European Commission, Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures to Support the
Economy in the Current COVID-19 Outbreak, [2020] C91 I/1 (20 Mar. 2020) as Amended [2020] C112
I/1 (4 Apr. 2020).
32 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 Dec. 2013 on the application of Arts 107 and 108
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis, OJ L 352, 1–8 (24 Dec.
2013).
33 In line with Art. 106 of the TFEU and Directive 2006/111/EC on the Transparency of Financial
Relations Between Member States and Public Undertakings as well as on Financial Transparency
within Certain Undertakings, [2006] OJ L 318/17 (17 Nov. 2006).
34 In line with Art. 106(2) of the TFEU and the ‘Altmark criteria’ set out in Altmark, supra n. 3, para. 95.
See Decision 2012/21/EC on the application of Art. 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain under-
takings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, [2012] OJ L 7, 3–10 (11
Jan. 2012).
35 Altmark, supra n. 3, para. 87.
36 European Commission, Guidelines on State Aid to Airports and Airlines, [2014] OJ C 99/3 (‘2014
Guidelines’), para. 70 (4 Apr. 2014). See Regulation 1008/2008, supra n. 6, Arts 16–18.
37 2014 Guidelines, supra n. 36, para. 72.
38 Regulation 1008/2008, supra n. 6, Arts 16(12) and 17.
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Additional state aid rules are laid down in horizontal, sector-specific guide-
lines. With respect to air transport, the currently in force 2014 Guidelines address
the compatibility of investment and ‘transitional’ operating aid to airports and
‘start-up’ aid to airlines.39 Investment aid should be used to build airport capa-
city, whereas operating aid may be used within a ‘transition period’ of up to ten
years if the aid will make an improvement to the airport which the market alone
cannot deliver.40 If an airport is facing closure, ‘transitional’ operating aid may be
a route to funding its survival. The 2014 Guidelines set out that aid to ‘start-up’
certain new routes may be provided to airlines for a maximum of three years.41
This may be useful in the present crisis where an airline withdraws certain routes
on which it was the sole operator. The guidelines also clarify the financial
relationships between airports and airlines in the contexts of the MEO test and
state aid.42
2.2 MEASURES RELATED TO COVID-19
The EC responded to the COVID-19 outbreak by devising a series of legislative
proposals to address economic fallout across a range of sectors, including a fast-
track state aid approval process.43 To enable Member States to support the
economy, the EC adopted a new Temporary Framework for State Aid in March
2020.44 While Member States can notify the EC of aid schemes on the basis of
existing avenues e.g. Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and the Rescue and
Restructuring State aid Guidelines,45 this new Temporary Framework flexibly
allows for ‘limited amounts of aid to undertakings that find themselves facing a
sudden shortage or even unavailability of liquidity can be an appropriate, necessary
and targeted solution during the current circumstances’.46 The Framework has
been extended to allow Member States to provide aid in the form of subordinated
debt, equity injections and hybrid capital injections.
39 See 2014 Guidelines, supra n. 36.
40 The maximum aid permissible will depend on the airport’s size in passenger traffic. 2014 Guidelines,
supra n. 36, para. 128.
41 The aid may cover up to 50% of eligible costs. 2014 Guidelines, supra n. 36, para. 150.
42 2014 Guidelines, supra n. 36, para. 53.
43 European Commission, State Aid Rules and Coronavirus, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
what_is_new/covid_19.html (accessed 5 June 2020).
44 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures
to Support the Economy in the Current COVID-19 Outbreak, OJ C 91 I/1 (20 Mar. 2020). The
Temporary Framework has twice been amended, see [2020] C 112/1 (4 Apr. 2020) and C(2020)
3156 final (8 May 2020).
45 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, supra n. 27.
46 European Commission, Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures to Support the Economy in the Current
COVID-19 Outbreak, [2020] OJ C91 I/4 (20 Mar. 2020).
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Under Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU, ‘aid to promote the execution of an
important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy of a Member State’ may be considered compatible with the
internal market. In response to the global financial and economic crisis that
began in 2008, the EC adopted its first-ever Temporary Framework for State
Aid, which provided detailed guidance on the criteria and compatibility of state aid
to banks and non-financial firms in line with the requirements of Article 107(3)(b)
of the TFEU.47 This Temporary Framework was ‘intended to provide Member
States with the possibility to adopt additional state aid measures aimed at facilitating
companies’ access to finance and at the same time encouraging companies to
continue investing in the future during these exceptional circumstances’.48 The
aim was to ‘remedy a serious disturbance’ in the economy.
According to Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU, ‘aid to make good the
damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences’ is compatible
with the internal market. The damage caused by COVID-19 constitutes an
exceptional occurrence.49 According to the EC, ‘[t]he exceptional nature of the
COVID-19 outbreak means that such damages could not have been foreseen,
are of a significant scale and hence put undertakings in conditions that sharply
differ from the market conditions in which they normally operate’.50 Under
this same legal basis, the EC approved state aid to stakeholders in the air
transport sector which were impacted following the terrorist attacks of 11
September.51
Now again, under Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU, Member States can
compensate undertakings in sectors that have been particularly hit, e.g. air
transport, for damages suffered due to and directly caused by the COVID-19
outbreak. Damages are calculated as the difference between estimated traffic
(revenue) and costs with no pandemic, and actual traffic (lost revenue) and
unavoidable costs, for the duration of the flight restrictions (reference period).
Damage compensation measures agreed by States must be notified to the EC
47 European Commission, Temporary Community Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to
Finance in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, [2009] OJ C 16/1 (22 Jan. 2009).
48 European Commission, Temporary Union Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in
the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, [2011] OJ C 6/5 (11 Jan. 2011).
49 The Commission concluded accordingly in its Decision of 12 Mar. 2020, SA.56686 (2020/N) – DK
Compensation Scheme for Cancellation of Events Related to COVID-19, https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/state_aid/cases1/202011/285054_2139535_70_2.pdf, accessed 13 Mar. 2020.
50 European Commission, Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures to Support the Economy in the Current
COVID-19 Outbreak, C(2020) 1863 Final 2 (19 Mar. 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_
aid/what_is_new/sa_covid19_temporary-framework.pdf, accessed 20 Mar. 2020.
51 Under ex. Art. 87(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, [2002] OJ C 325, 67 (24
Dec. 2012). See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council: The Repercussions of the Terrorist Attacks in the United States on the Air Transport Industry,
[2001] COM 0574, 1–15 (10 Oct. 2001).
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for approval. As these measures do not constitute rescue aid, restructuring aid
or temporary restructuring support, the ‘one time, last time’ principle in the
Rescue and Restructuring State aid Guidelines will not apply.52 Instead, com-
pensation will be assessed directly under Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU. The
Temporary Framework clarifies that under Article 107(2)(b) of the TEFU,
‘Member States may compensate under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU the damages
directly caused by the COVID-19 outbreak to undertakings that have received
aid under the Rescue and Restructuring State aid Guidelines’.53 Thus, the EC
appears to take a flexible approach to state aid in the current crisis.
Although the United States (US) by comparison has no rules on state aid,
courts have ruled aid provided by local authorities or US states as unlawful ‘threats
to fair competition’.54 It is commonly known that the US Federal Government
grants aid to a wide range of economic sectors, e.g. oil and automobile manufac-
turing, agriculture and healthcare.
In the next section, the impact and implications of the COVID-19 outbreak
on each of the four air transport stakeholders and state aid measures applied at the
time of writing will be examined.55
3 AIRLINES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
On 17 March 2020, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the world
airline trade association, estimated that airlines will need USD 200 billion to
‘survive the virus’.56 By late April, IATA published that the sector’s estimated
loss in revenues is USD 314 billion.57 Of the four stakeholders discussed in this
article, airlines appear to be the hardest hit.
In normal economic times, airlines might have secured finance from private
investors or banks subject to the creditworthiness of the applicant. In this time of
crisis, investors are exceptionally cautious even towards creditworthy firms
52 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, supra n. 27.
53 Temporary Framework, supra n. 46.
54 See Diane P. Wood, State Aid Management in the United States, 12(1) Eur. St. Aid L. 40 (2013).
55 The author acknowledges that States may have granted loans issued at market rates or other de minimis
support. As these types of state aid do not require EC notification, they are excluded from the present
discussion; see Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 Dec. 2013 on the Application of
Arts 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de Minimis Aid, [2013]
OJ L 352, 1–8 (24 Dec. 2013).
56 Christopher Jasper & Siddharth Vikram Philip, Airlines Need Up to $200 Billion to Survive Virus, IATA
Says (Bloomberg 17 Mar. 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-17/airlines-
need-up-to-200-bailout-to-survive-virus-iata-warns, accessed 20 Mar. 2020.
57 IATA, IATA Economics (1 May 2020), https://www.iata.org, accessed 1 May 2020.
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owing to an uncertain economic future. For airlines that were already in diffi-
culty before COVID-19, private investor recapitalization is now unthinkable. A
state grant, loan or other guarantee may be an airline’s only option shy of being
(re-)nationalized or going bust. In any case, an airline’s success in securing state
aid will depend in the first instance on both the ownership of the airline in
question and its flag.
Liberalisation of airline markets around the world has prompted a major
evolution in the global market for air services.58 Many of the world’s formerly
state-owned airlines are now partially or fully privatized, especially in Europe. In
2017, when the global aviation business in many regards was booming, this author
argued that ‘international civil aviation is shedding its flag-obsession to become
more global’.59 In the present crisis, however, the trend may be towards de-
globalization; COVID-19 offers a counterargument in favour of re-nationalization
and protectionism.60 When times are good, fewer airlines in liberalized and
deregulated markets will be ‘protected at all costs from the risks and opportunities
associated with the free market’, whilst States may seek to protect some air carriers
at any cost in times of crisis.61
3.2 EUROPEAN AIRLINES
The subsidiary airlines of the Lufthansa Group: Deutsche Lufthansa
(Lufthansa), Austrian Airlines, Brussels Airlines and Swiss International Air
Lines (Swiss) are owned by the Group’s private shareholders.62 In late April
2020, the Group warned that it would run out of cash within weeks if it does
not receive state aid.63 Lufthansa’s subsidiary, Germanwings, has ceased opera-
tions. Before it approached the German Government for support, Lufthansa
grounded almost all of its aircraft and permanently decommissioned more than
forty jets.64 The German Government already provided another German
58 See Steven Truxal, Competition and Regulation in the Airline Industry: Puppets in Chaos (Routledge 2012).
59 Steven Truxal, Economic and Environmental Regulation of International Aviation: From Inter-National to
Global Governance, xviii (Routledge 2017).
60 See Javier Espinoza, Vestager Urges Stakebuilding to Block Chinese Takeovers, Financial Times (12 Apr.
2020), https://on.ft.com/2XYhB13 (accessed 12 Apr. 2020).
61 Truxal, supra n. 59.
62 Lufthansa Group, ‘Shareholders’ Structure as of 09 April 2020 (14. Apr. 2020), https://investor-relations.
lufthansagroup.com/en/news/shareholder-structure/investor-relations-shareholder-news/date/2020/
04/14/shareholders-structure-as-of-09-april-2020.html (accessed 14 Apr. 2020).
63 Joe Miller & Tanya Powley, Lufthansa Warns It Will Run Out of Cash in Weeks, Financial Times (23
Apr. 2020), https://on.ft.com/3awPTLp (accessed 23 Apr. 2020).
64 Arno Schuetze & Ilona Wissenbach, Exclusive: Germany in Talks to Inject Billions Into Lufthansa-Sources,
Reuters (2 Apr. 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-germany-lufthansa/
exclusive-germany-in-talks-to-inject-billions-into-lufthansa-sources-idUSKBN21K1Q5 (accessed 2
Apr. 2020).
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carrier, Condor, with a loan of EUR 550 million, which the EC assessed and
approved under Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU.65 Condor was due to be
taken over by the Polish state-owned flag carrier LOT Polskie Linie Lotnicze
(LOT), but LOT pulled out of the deal in April 2020, which perhaps goes
some way to give reasoning for the state intervention.66
In Germany, a heated debate was sparked when a partial government takeover of
Lufthansa was first proposed in April 2020; the airline was fully privatized in 1997.67
Lufthansa’s chief executive officer (CEO)warned that if Germany ‘wanted to exert too
much influence on operational business tasks, perhaps the Austrian government would
demand the same, and then possibly Switzerland, Belgium […]’, admitting it would be
‘very difficult to control a corporation like that’.68 Following a series of difficult
negotiations, the German Government and Lufthansa agreed a rescue package worth
EUR 9 billion, comprised of EUR 6 billion in recapitalization and a EUR 3 billion
loan, in exchange for a 20% German Government stake in the airline, which can be
increased to 25% plus one share, plus two seats nominated by Berlin on its supervisory
board.69 In connectionwith the agreement, theGermanMinister for EconomicAffairs
clarified in a statement how the German Government intended to exercise its role on
the board in response to a specific question on carbon emission targets. He said that the
government ‘deliberately refrained from imposing conditions beyond the broader
sustainability requirement, because our aim is not to have the state determine the
company’s day-to-day business strategy’.70 The GermanGovernment approach thus is
one of safeguarding, notably from hostile takeover attempts.71 The EC has approved
the state aid following Lufthansa commitments to relinquish eight aircraft and twenty
four airport slots at Frankfurt and Munich; shareholders approved the package.72
65 European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves €550 Million German State-Guaranteed Loan to
Compensate Airline Condor for Damage Caused by Coronavirus Outbreak, Press Release IP/20/752 (27 Apr.
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_752 (accessed 28 Apr. 2020).
66 James Shotter & Guy Chazan, Poland’s Lot Airline Pulls Out of Condor Deal, Financial Times (16 Apr.
2020), https://on.ft.com/3d3sVgz (accessed 17 Apr. 2020).
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The Lufthansa Group also approached Austria, Belgium and Switzerland for state
aid.73 A bailout agreed between the Austrian Government and Austrian Airlines for
approximately EUR 600 million for Austrian Airlines would not allow dividends to be
paid to investors for one year, would limit manager bonuses and would not allow
redundancies. The Austrian Government’s priority is to keep Austrian Airlines as an
independent company based in Austria within the Lufthansa Group,74 and the govern-
ment support comes with conditions relating to climate targets.75 The Federal Council
of Switzerland offered Swiss and its subsidiary Edelweiss support in the form of a CHF
1.5 billion (EUR 1.4 billion) loan that is 85% government-backed; the aid has been
approved by the Swiss Parliament.76 Brussels Airlines has sought EUR 200 million from
the government of Belgium.77While Lufthansa has ‘no intention of abandoning Brussels
Airlines whatever the Belgian government’s decision’ regarding the application for state
aid, ‘[t]he question is a sensitive one in Belgium, where memories of Sabena remain
unhealed’.78 A rescue package reportedly of EUR 290 million is on the table.79
Norwegian Air Shuttle has grounded most of its fleet.80 It should be added that
the low-cost carrier had financial challenges before the COVID-19 crisis. Four of
Norwegian’s subsidiary staffing companies based in Denmark and Sweden declared
bankruptcy in April 2020.81 The Government of Norway granted Norwegian a
NOK 3 billion (EUR 275 million) loan guarantee. As a condition of the loan, the
73 See Teodor Stefan, Lufthansa Retires Six A380s, Seven a340-600s, Five 747-400s and 11 A320s,
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airline was required to increase its equity, which it achieved largely through invest-
ment by two of the world’s largest aircraft lessors: Ireland’s AerCap (15.9%) and
BOC Aviation (12.7%), majority owned by the Bank of China (BOC).82 The
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority approved the
aid.83
In the United Kingdom (UK), the Chancellor said the Government would
consider providing state aid to companies on a case-by-case basis and ‘only if all
commercial avenues have been explored, including raising capital from existing
investors’. With that said, EasyJet secured a GBP 600 million (EUR 672 million)
government loan, which the EC approved under Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU.84
The CEO of the International Consolidated Airlines Group (IAG) is confident that
British Airways, and sister airlines Iberia and Vueling ‘would not need State aid to
weather the current storm’.85 Nonetheless, Iberia and Vueling have secured EUR
1 billion in state-backed loans from the Spanish Government.86 Virgin Atlantic,
which is part-owned by Delta Airlines (49%), asked for GBP 500 million (EUR
560 million) in state aid comprised of a loan and credit guarantee.87
Air France, the French flag carrier, and Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij
(KLM), the Dutch flag carrier, are subsidiaries of the Air France-KLM Group. The
Group is owned by the French State (14.3%), the Dutch State (14%), two airlines
(Delta and China Southern), the Group’s employees and other investors.88 Subject
to EC approval, KLM will receive EUR 3.4 billion in state aid in the form of
loans; in turn, the airline is required to reduce night flights at Amsterdam Schiphol
Airport (AMS) by 20% and to cut employee salaries.89 The Dutch Finance
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Minister said that the Group CEO’s bonus payments ‘in these times of crisis are
unwise and incompatible with support funded by taxpayers’ money’.90 This echoes
the constraints on businesses receiving state aid put forward by the EC, such as
paying bonuses, dividends, or taking excessive risks.91
In March 2020, the EC approved France’s deferral of certain air taxes until
2021 and offer to airlines of up to twenty-four months to pay the taxes under
Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU.92 It is unclear whether this deferral is intended to
apply to all airlines operating in France. The French government pledged support
for companies hit by the pandemic, ‘with options including stakes, recapitalization
or even renationalization. … [and that it] wanted to preserve the airline “at any
cost” and would provide it with the “massive support” it would need’.93 France
has the highest number of PSO routes of any EU Member State.94
France will provide Air France EUR 7 billion in state-backed loans, com-
prised of EUR 3 billion in loans and 90% guarantee on an additional EUR 4
billion in bank loans, on two conditions: (1) ‘Air France must become the most
environmentally friendly airline on the planet’ and (2) the loans are ‘intended solely
for the needs of the subsidiary Air France’.95 The EC approved the loan under
Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU to ‘remedy a serious disturbance’ in the French
economy.96 The guarantee is in line with the Temporary Framework conditions as
Air France was not in difficulty on or before 31 December 2019.
Firstly, Community carriers like Air France are entitled to operate intra-
Community air services.97 To ‘become the most environmentally friendly airline’,
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Commission, PSO Inventory Table (18 Sept. 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/
files/pso_inventory_table.pdf (accessed 14 May 2020). The PSO principles and procedures are set
out in Regulation 1008/2008, supra n. 6, Arts 16–18.
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the French government has indicated it will require Air France to cancel a number
of domestic routes. It is questionable whether, with reference to the common
rules, France will in fact subject Air France’s domestic operations to special permits
or authorizations in future.98
Secondly, in the second condition it is clearly stipulated that the aid is solely
for ‘the needs’ of Air France. In its appraisal of aid granted following the events of
11 September 2001, to compensate for the extra cost of insurance premiums, the
EC considered at that time whether the public intervention applied ‘uniformly
without restriction to all companies in a given Member State’.99 The EC gave
‘priority to those least likely to distort competition between Community airlines, i.e.
measures applicable to all Community undertakings on a uniform basis’.100
This time around, in approving the aid to Air France, the EC did not give the
same consideration to a uniform application to all companies. This could explain
why the CEO of Ryanair, which has bases in Bordeaux, Marseille and Toulouse,
has publicly voiced strong criticism of the EC’s decision. Nevertheless, the facts
prompting the state aid in 2001 were different from the COVID-19 situation, the
aid for which was approved to remedy ‘direct damage caused by exceptional
circumstances’ under what is now Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU. This may
explain why the EC took a different approach when approving the Air France aid.
As an aside, the Air France aid would arguably satisfy the first element in the
Article 107(3)(b) derogation, ‘to promote the execution of an important project of
common European interest’.101 Environmental protection is one such project. If
the aid has an incentive effect, that is it ‘induces the beneficiary to change its
behaviour to increase the level of environmental protection […], a change in
behaviour which it would not undertake without the aid’, the EC would also
have approved it.102
Airline holding company SAS Group owns Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and
Scandinavian Airlines Ireland. SAS Group is owned by Sweden (14.82%),
Denmark (14.24%), a research foundation and private investors. In light of damage
caused by the COVID-19 crisis, Denmark provided SAS with a EUR 137 million
state guarantee in the form of a revolving credit facility.103 Sweden granted the
98 Regulation 1008/2008, supra n. 6, Art. 15(2).
99 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
The repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United States on the air transport industry, [2001] COM 574
final (10 Oct. 2001), para. 38.
100 Ibid., para. 28.
101 TFEU, supra n. 3, Art. 107(3)(b).
102 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental
Protection and Energy 2014–2020, [2014] OJ C 200, 1–55, para. 49.
103 European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Danish Public Guarantee of up to €137 Million to
Compensate Airline SAS for Damage Caused by Coronavirus Outbreak, Press Release IP/20/667 (15 Apr.
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_667 (accessed 15 Apr. 2020).
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Group a loan of EUR 140 million, which came from a EUR 445 million
guarantee scheme that was made available to all airlines holding a Swedish com-
mercial aviation licence as at 1 January 2020.104 While the EC approved the
Danish scheme under the Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU legal basis, the Swedish
scheme was approved, like the French scheme discussed earlier, under Article 107
(3)(b) of the TFEU.105 Norway pledged EUR 130 million as part of the loan
guarantee discussed earlier.106
The Italian Government is reportedly in the process of a EUR 3 billion re-
nationalization of Alitalia.107 In February 2020, the EC launched an in-depth
investigation into an unapproved EUR 400 million loan Alitalia received earlier
from the Italian Government.108
3.3 OTHER AIRLINES
In the US, under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economy Security (CARES)
Act, USD 50 billion is earmarked for the aviation sector.109 US airlines, all of
which are private, will receive USD 25 billion in grants and USD 29 billion in loan
guarantees in exchange for minimum staffing requirements. Cargo airlines will
receive USD 4 billion in grants.110 This state aid approach is seemingly pragmatic
when compared with the generalist EU approach, on the basis that US carriers may
be advantaged by such sizeable support in addition to wage support schemes and
tax relief.111 In exchange for state aid support under CARES, airlines are obligated
to issue warrants to the US Government for the purchase of airlines’ common
104 See European Commission, State Aid: Commission Approves €445 Million Swedish Guarantee Scheme to
Support Airlines Affected by the Coronavirus Outbreak, Press Release IP/20/647 (11 Apr. 2020), https://
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sion/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_349 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
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stock. This raises important questions on remuneration for taxpayer investment
and the role of the State in airlines’ future strategies.
Australia’s second-largest airline, Virgin Australia, entered voluntary
administration.112 Virgin Australia held a little over 30% of the domestic market
and was the biggest competitor to flag carrier Qantas Airways. The airline is owned
by Chinese investors (40%), Etihad (20%), Singapore Airlines (20%) and the Virgin
Group (10%). The Australian government did not approve a requested bailout of
AUD 1.4 billion (EUR 810 million).113 The reasoning for Australia’s decision
seemed to be that Australia is the ‘wrong’ State to offer aid. The airline is not
Australian-owned but rather in part state-owned via Etihad, which is owned by
Abu Dhabi government and Singapore Airlines, which is majority owned by the
government of Singapore. Singapore Airlines will receive a USD 13 billion lifeline
from its Government.114 So, a State will be inclined to extend its hand to an airline
it owns, if the law permits, though as this example shows, only if the airline flies
that State’s flag. Unsupported by its foreign shareholders, Virgin Australia’s flag did
not invite a ‘local’ rescue.
The Gulf carriers, which for years have been the focus of state aid allegations,
have also indicated they are seriously affected by the COVID-19 crisis. At the time
of writing, Etihad and Emirates are only operating limited one-way flights out of
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).115 while Qatar Airways is operating selected
repatriation flights. The UAE Government announced that it will ‘grant unspeci-
fied financial aid to Emirates, and that the government is committed to providing
the full support by injecting fresh capital’.116 Qatar Airways has said it will need
state aid as cash runs out117 and that it is planning to defer salary payments for
certain staff.118
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4 AIRPORTS, ANSPS, MANUFACTURERS
Airports and ANSPs around the world have requested that States include them in
COVID-19 recovery plans. As the demand for air travel has declined, so too has
the airport business in terms of landing fees, terminal use charges and retail. Some
airports have closed, while others continue collecting revenue through increased
cargo operations and aircraft storage.
Airports Council International (ACI) published a policy brief on the world
airports’ recovery from COVID-19.119 Forecasting a loss of EUR 14 billion,
European airports are likely availing of the general package of macroeconomic
state aid under the Temporary Framework and Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU, e.g.
wage subsidies, suspension of payments of corporate and value added taxes or social
welfare contributions. One specific notification relating to airports was from
Belgium for a scheme allowing Walloon airports to defer payment of concession
fees, which was approved under Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU.120
In Europe, 82.4% of airports are fully or partially state-owned.121 As discussed
earlier, the economic and non-economic activities of state-owned airports may be
separated, such that keeping an airport open for essential travel, repatriation and
cargo flights in the current crisis would likely be deemed an exercise of its public
powers. The funding of such activity would not constitute state aid. States might
even require airports to remain open to commercial traffic via PSOs.122 Still,
airports are losing revenue from airport charges and retail concession fees, which
they usually collect in the pursuance of an economic activity. Subject to the MEO
test, public support for this aspect of an airport operation may qualify as state aid.
The aid may be permissible if granted in accordance with the 2014 Guidelines or
Article 107(2)(b) of the TFEU, as mentioned earlier.
Although the overall number of passenger flights has declined, the airspace
remains largely operational. The majority of the world’s ANSPs are state-owned.
For those ANSPs which have been privatized, States have retained majority own-
ership for reasons of safety and national security.123 Most activities ANSPs provide
119 ACI, ACI World Policy Brief Lays Out Road Map for Industry Recovery from COVID-19 (17 Apr. 2020),
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122 The duties of States vis-à-vis providing airports and ANSPs are set out in International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), Doc. 7300, Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944, Art. 28.
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are considered to be non-economic in nature, and therefore public support to fund
such activities generally will not constitute state aid.124
In connection with providing air navigation services in the Single European Sky
(SES), some financial risks are shared between ANSPs and airspace users. The
‘performance and charging scheme’125 aims to provide for a traffic risk sharing
mechanism between ANSPs and airports, with the aim of incentivising the provision
of services.126 If the scheme continues to apply post-COVID, it is expected that
ANSPs will be less affected than airspace users as most of the decline in traffic will be
borne by airlines.127
Member States of the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(Eurocontrol) agreed to help airlines in Europe by deferring payments of air traffic
control fees of EUR 1.13 billion. While EU competition rules apply in principle
to international organizations, the CJEU has held that Eurocontrol is not an
‘undertaking’ as it does not perform economic activities.128 Instead, it provides
assistance to Member States in carrying out its tasks of maintaining and developing
air space management. This activity is not separable from its exercise of public
powers done to achieve public objectives: safety.
According to the International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries
Associations (ICCAIA), ‘[t]he entire aerospace sector, from manufacturers to small
businesses within the supply chain, face extraordinary circumstances that will have
a major and widespread impact on the global economy’.129 Indeed, with most
aircraft grounded until further notice, airlines are unlikely to require additional
capacity from new aircraft anytime soon. The world’s two largest aircraft manu-
facturers, Boeing and Airbus, are acutely impacted owing to factory closures and
demand-side economics. Businesses in the manufacturing supply chains are also
affected, and bankruptcies pose a risk to aircraft manufacturers. that aircraft parts
and components are produced around the world. If an original equipment
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manufacturer (OEM) fails, for instance, Airbus and Boeing production lines will be
halted.
In April 2020, aircraft lessors rescinded orders for new Boeing 737 MAX
aircraft worth USD 17.8 billion at list prices.130 The manufacturer has reportedly
offered deep discounts to other customers to avoid cancellation of orders.131
Overall production at Airbus is down by a third.132
Are Boeing and Airbus likely to receive state subsidies to compensate damages
caused by the COVID-19 crisis? The response from Washington is that Boeing
should approach private investors before government support will be considered.
With that said, the US government has reportedly developed a USD 17 billion
package for businesses like Boeing that are deemed to be ‘critical to maintaining
national security’.133
In the context of public support for Airbus, the COVID-19 crisis has re-
energized an already on-going discussion within the EU on building a ‘New
Industrial Strategy’ as Europe ‘embarks on its transition towards climate neutrality
and digital leadership in an ever-changing and ever more unpredictable world’.134
Through such a strategy, Europe will aim to reinforce its industrial and strategic
autonomy to ensure that it is less dependent in future on the global market within
areas of strategic importance. Arguably, an airline manufacturer like Airbus could
fall within the scope of such a policy, which could open a new avenue of support
from the EU budget.135
With that said, even when airline traffic picks up and airports return to more
normal operations, they may be unlikely to place new orders with manufactures of
aircraft and other aerospace equipment. In the absence of new state or private
support, it is possible that manufacturers will continue to operate at a loss or be a
risk of collapse well into any period of meaningful recovery experienced by other
stakeholders in the global air transport sector. The Aerospace and Defence
Industries Association of Europe (ASD), has warned that the ‘impact [of
130 David Fickling, Coronavirus Has Popped the Boeing and Airbus Bubble, Bloomberg (25 Apr. 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-25/coronavirus-pops-boeing-airbus-avia
tion-growth-bubble (accessed 26 Apr. 2020).
131 Peggy Hollinger, How Coronavirus Brought Aerospace Down to Earth, Financial Times (20 Apr. 2020),
https://on.ft.com/2XQ1FO6 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
132 Peggy Hollinger, Airbus Cuts Aircraft Production by a Third, Financial Times (8 Apr. 2020), https://on.ft.
com/2zBRra5 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
133 Aaron Gregg, Jeff Stein & Josh Dawsey, Senate Aid Package Quietly Carves Out Billions Intended for
Boeing, Officials Say, The Washington Post (25 Mar. 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi
ness/2020/03/25/boeing-bailout-coronavirus/ (accessed 25 Mar. 2020).
134 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A New
Industrial Strategy for Europe, COM(2020) 102 final, 1 (10 Mar. 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/communication-eu-industrial-strategy-march-2020_en.pdf (accessed 20 Mar. 2020).
135 With due respect to the WTO rules on state subsidies, supra n. 15.
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COVID-19] is particularly devastating for Europe’s civil aerospace industry which
may face an existential threat’.136
5 CONCLUSION
In these unprecedented times, the world seems in so many ways to have been
turned on its head. A return to the status quo is not envisaged. The COVID-19
crisis has sparked a reflection in society on pre-crisis travel behaviours, including
travel by air. In the immediate term, the impact of ‘stay at home’ will likely be felt
by the air transport sector even after borders re-open and flights resume. The
reduction in flights has decreased levels of noise and environmental pollution. It is
foreseeable that this will contribute to a change in public attitudes in the medium
term towards air travel, particularly with respect to ‘cheap flights’ and so-called
‘binge travelling’. We can expect that some airlines may fail and that a combination
of lower demand and high debt will mean leaner airline and airport operations in
future.
The global economic fallout of the COVID-19 crisis is enormous. In turn,
state aid is growing in significance globally. The state aid initiatives discussed in this
article have been designed to absorb the economic shock in the air transport sector
and beyond, and at the same time limit the impact on States. While the underlying
state aid criteria remain, the rules have been loosened temporarily in light of
COVID-19. The Temporary Framework allows Member States to use the full
flexibility of state aid law to act quickly when time is of the essence, such as in the
present crisis. Member States have provided unprecedented levels of public support
to some stakeholders in the air transport sector. That support comes with a price
tag in the form of novel conditions. A few months ago it would have been
unthinkable to suggest that a blocking minority in Lufthansa might one day be
an option held by the German Government, or that the French Government
might require Air France to cease its domestic operations as a climate measure.
Indeed, we are living in a changed world.
With a view to maintaining a level playing field within the internal market,
European state aid rules have evolved and modernized in ‘better’ times before
COVID-19. Now, the crisis exposes an imbalance in public support offered by the
different States. Take for instance the incredible volume of state aid provided by
Germany and France. This is mirrored specifically in public support schemes for air
transport: state recapitalization of privatized carrier Lufthansa; and state-backed
loans for already state-owned Air France.
136 ASD, COVID-19 Updates & Resources (4 May 2020), https://www.asd-europe.org/covid-19-updates-
resources (accessed 15 May 2020).
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Rightly, on one hand this raises concern over unfair competition between
European airlines and the impact this will have on the internal market and
consumer welfare. On the other hand, States’ involvement in large carriers could
send signals to the market about their viability and thus defend temporary State aid
measures that aim to remedy market disturbances. But it also risks, rather ironically,
opening the door to future challenge by non-EU carriers, which have for years
stood accused of accepting state aids and harming EU carriers and consumers in the
internal market.137
As we have seen, someMember States, notably France, have seized the opportunity
to promote the green agenda with climate targets attached as conditions to state aid,
whereby accelerating green innovation in air transport. If airlines do not become
‘greener’, they could risk being replaced by other forms of transport on short haul
markets. States may choose to invest in high-speed rail links, for instance. This is a policy
choice; legally, it seems possible. A State may decide to favour certain sectors, say rail
over air transport, which in EU state aid law ‘would be justified in the case of services of
general economic interest, [but] less so to stimulate economic activity in general, possibly
to the detriment of productions in other Member States’.138 It is worth bearing in mind
that another leading Member State, Germany, specifically decided on a different
approach to France; green conditions are not attached to the Lufthansa aid. This does
not necessarily mean that the German government does not support the green agenda
including in air transport. One may speculate that given Lufthansa unlike Air France is
fully privatized, the German Government’s room for policy manoeuvring is limited.
Thus, it could not dictate concrete policies as conditions to the Lufthansa aid, even if it
may have had the same considerations as the French Government.
As an alternative or in addition to public support, States could relax consumer
protection rules that require airlines to refund passengers for flights cancelled
owing to COVID-19 restrictions.139 The EC has recommended that flight vou-
chers be made an attractive option for consumers.140 At the same time, the EC
confirmed that EU air passenger rights in this regard remain unchanged. Passengers
137 See for a more thorough discussion, Truxal, supra n. 59, at 103–119.
138 Sandra Santamato & Nicola Pesaresi, Compensation for Services of General Economic Interest: Some Thoughts
on the Altmark Ruling, 1 Competition Pol’y Newsl. 20 (Spring 2004), https://ec.europa.eu/competi
tion/publications/cpn/2004_1_17.pdf (accessed 15 May 2020).
139 Article 8(1)(a), Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
Feb. 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of
denied boarding and of cancellation or long flight delay of flights, [2004] OJ L 46, 1–8, (17 Feb. 2004).
See also Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Nov. 2015 on
package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directive 90/314/EEC,OJ L 326, 1 (11 Dec 2015).
140 Lufthansa for one has introduced an incentive credit of EUR 50 on top of the unused ticket value to
passengers who accept a voucher in lieu of cash. See Lufthansa, Flight Voucher, https://lufthansa.
flightvoucher.com (accessed 1 June 2020).
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must be able to choose to receive a refund.141 It is understood, however, that there
is wide Member State support for relaxing the current rules so as to ease the burden
on the sector.
While its effects may be felt for a long time after, the COVID-19 crisis one
day will end as will the temporary measures. In her tweets, the Competition
Commissioner writes that approved aid is important for jobs and connectivity
though it also ‘comes with strings attached to protect the level playing field’.
Furthermore, the Commissioner has clearly stated that, once the crisis is over,
the EC will ‘make sure that taxpayers are sufficiently remunerated for their
investment, and companies that receive capital support are subject to controls
and governance provisions that limit possible distortions to competition in the
Single Market’142. If an undertaking is still in difficulty or the government stakes in
them are too high, the EC may require restructuring plans to be drawn up and
submitted for approval. Conditions will likely continue to be attached to future
recapitalizations, such as giving up aircraft and airport slots as in the case of
Lufthansa.
The COVID-19 crisis may have prompted many changes to the world as we
know it, including in the field of air transport. Europe’s commitment to a liberal
market economy will, however, continue to set the boundaries of its state aid
regime. The Commissioner’s message is clear: a profound change to the general
EU state aid rules is not expected when they are due to resume in 2021.
141 See European Commission, Interpretative Guidelines on EU Air Passenger Rights Regulations in the Context
of the Developing Situation with COVID-19, [2020] OJ C 89I, 1 (18 Mar. 2020); European Commission,
Commission Recommendation of 13.5.2020 on Vouchers Offered to Passengers and Travellers as an Alternative
to Reimbursement for Cancelled Package Travel and Transport Services in the Context of the COVID-19
Pandemic, C(2020) 3125 final (13 May 2020).
142 These are the words of Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President of the EC for a Europe Fit for
the Digital Age and Competition Commissioner; see European Commission, Coronavirus: Commission
Statement on Consulting Member States on Proposal to Further Expand State Aid Temporary Framework to
Recapitalisation Measures (9 Apr. 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
STATEMENT_20_610 (accessed 12 Apr. 2020).
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